[No. 53]

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JUL 14 1960

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REPORT

OF

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL MILITARY AIRLIFT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARINGS MARCH 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 28, 31,
APRIL 1, 4, 7, 8, 11, 20, 21, AND 22, 1960

Printed for the use of the House Committee on Armed Services

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
49066 WASHINGTON : 1960

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REPORT OF SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL MILITARY AIRLIFT

Background

On January 21, 1960, the House Committee on Armed Services began its annual military posture briefings. During the course of those hearings it became abundantly clear that serious questions which had persisted, with reference to our national military airlift, remained unsolved. This matter was of such concern to the chairman of the full committee that it was deemed both advisable and necessary to make a complete study of the entire airlift situation. Accordingly, on January 29, 1960, in keeping with the decision of the full committee, Mr. Vinson, chairman of the full committee, appointed a special subcommittee to undertake this study. The chairman's letter of January 29, designating the membership of the special subcommittee and setting forth its jurisdiction and responsibility was as follows:

Hon. L. Mendel Rivers,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Rivers: Pursuant to the authority contained in Committee Resolution 4, adopted January 21, 1959, I herewith appoint a special subcommittee for the purpose of conducting an inquiry into the adequacy, or inadequacy, of the national airlift, insofar as that national capability relates to the requirements of national defense.

The membership of the committee is as follows: Mr. Rivers, chairman, Mr. Price, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Fisher, representing the majority; Mr. Gavin, Mr. Bray, and Mr. Becker, representing the minority, the minority membership having been designated after consultation with Mr. Arends, the ranking minority member.

It shall be within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the subcommittee to undertake as promptly as possible a complete inquiry into all aspects of the national airlift including MATS, the CRAF program, other elements of military and civilian aviation pertinent to the subject, the type, number, availability, and adequacy of both aircraft, personnel, and required items of support for a national airlift in support of national defense, and such additional considerations as may be pertinent to the subject matter.

The subcommittee is directed to file its conclusions and recommendations upon completion of its inquiry, within the current session of Congress and as early as may be consistent with a full and factual consideration of the subject.

Sincerely,

Carl Vinson, *Chairman.*

It is obvious from paragraph 3 of the chairman's letter that all aspects of the national airlift problem were to be explored. With this responsibility in mind, the subcommittee began the preparation of an agenda which would insure the consideration and development of all phases of the national airlift, as it relates to the requirements of national defense.

Staff preparation consumed the period from January 29 to March 8, on which date hearings began. The subcommittee agenda, together with the list of witnesses on each of the subjects, was as follows:

1. Introduction:
   (*a*) Hon. James A. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defense.
   (*b*) Hon. Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army.
   (*c*) Hon. Dudley C. Sharp, Secretary of the Air Force.
2. Strategic airlift requirements and capabilities:
   (*a*) Capabilities to meet JCS requirements—Maj. Gen. Hewitt T. Wheless, Director of Plans, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (top secret).
   (*b*) Army requirements—Gen. L. L. Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (secret).
   (*c*) Navy requirements—Rear Adm. C. S. Cooper, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Air).
   (*d*) Marine requirements—Maj. Gen. A. F. Binney, U.S. Marine Corps.
   (*e*) Air Force requirements and overall capabilities for limited war—Maj. Gen. H. T. Wheless (secret).
3. Tactical airlift:
   (*a*) Army tactical airlift requirements—Maj. Gen. Ben Harrell, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Training, Continental Army Command (secret).
   (*b*) Air Force tactical airlift requirements—Maj. Gen. Cecil H. Childre, Deputy for Operations, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, USAF.
   (*c*) Tactical airlift capabilities—Maj. Gen. Cecil H. Childre, Headquarters, TAC.
4. Military Air Transport Service (current operations) (top secret):
   Lt. Gen. William H. Tunner, Commanding General, MATS.
   Brig. Gen. Glen R. Birchard, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, MATS.
   Col. Walter Cook, USAF, MATS.
   Col. Herbert Oglesby, USAF, MATS.
   Col. Hugh Wild, USAF, MATS.
   Col. George Leslie, USAF, MATS.
   Col. Allen Jones, USAF, MATS.
5. Airlift procurement practices:
   Brig. Gen. Lee W. Fulton, Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel, Headquarters MATS; Col. George Leslie, Headquarters MATS (procurement).
6. Air Force implementation of the DOD policy on national airlift:
   Maj. Gen. H. T. Wheless.
7. Civil Reserve Air Fleet:
   Brig. Gen. John K. Hester, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, USAF.
8. Joint military/civil development of uncompromised cargo aircraft:
   Maj. Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, Director of Operational Requirements, USAF.
9. Other airlift resources:
   (*a*) Strategic Support Squadrons—Brig. Gen. John K. Hester, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (Transportation), USAF.
   (*b*) Logistic Support Squadrons—Brig. Gen. John K. Hester, USAF.
   (*c*) Miscellaneous transport aircraft (4-engine)—Brig. Gen. John K. Hester, USAF.
   (*d*) LOGAIR—Col. Earl C. Hedlund, Director of Transportation, USAF.
   (*e*) Quick-Trans—Rear Adm. Thomas A. Long, Assistant Chief for Transportation, Bureau of Supply and Accounts, USN.
   (*f*) Navy Organic Airlift—Rear Adm. C. S. Cooper, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air).
   (*g*) Marine Organic Airlift—Maj. Gen. A. F. Binney, U.S. Marine Corps.
10. Summary of problem areas:
   (*a*) Problem areas as seen by the Army—Gen. L. L. Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (secret).
   (*b*) Problem areas as seen by the Navy—Rear Adm. C. S. Cooper, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air).
   (*c*) Problem areas as seen by the Marine Corps—Maj. Gen. A. S. Binney, U.S. Marine Corps.
   (*d*) Problem areas as seen by the Air Force—Gen. Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

While it had been the hope of the subcommittee that all of its hearings could be conducted in open session, it became obvious that much of the information to be submitted was classified, necessitating executive sessions. As a matter of fact, of the first 21 hours of presentation, 15 hours were conducted in executive session due solely to the degree of classification placed on the material by appropriate military authority.

The subcommittee's hearings extended from March 8 through April 22. A total of 22 sessions were held, each session consuming a minimum of 2 hours. During the course of the hearings 2,103 pages of testimony were developed.

During its consideration of the assigned subject, the subcommittee developed the following major points, which points will be discussed in the order listed in the ensuing portions of this report:

1. Strategic airlift requirements and capabilities, including adequacy or inadequacy.
2. Tactical airlift requirements and capabilities, including adequacy or inadequacy.
3. Other airlift resources, including—
   (*a*) Strategic support squadrons.
   (*b*) Logistic support squadrons.
   (*c*) Miscellaneous transportation squadrons.
   (*d*) LOGAIR.
   (*e*) Quick-Trans.
   (*f*) Navy Organic Airlift.
   (*g*) Marine Organic Airlift.
4. Military Air Transport Service, including—
   (*a*) Mission.
   (*b*) Requirements versus capabilities.
   (*c*) Peacetime utilization rate of aircraft.
   (*d*) Utilization of airlift by-product of peacetime utilization rate.
5. Civil Reserve Air Fleet.
   (*a*) Mission.
   (*b*) Requirements versus capabilities, including the number and type of aircraft.
   (*c*) Responsiveness to military requirements in both general war and limited military situations.
   (*d*) Full activation versus partial activation—Power of the President—Is legislation required?
6. Airlift procurement practices.
   (*a*) Current competitive bid practices.
   (*b*) Effect of this practice on improving capability of fleet.
   (*c*) Recommended solution to improve CRAF capability.
7. Modernization of MATS.
   (*a*) Interim modernization.
   (*b*) Long-range program.
8. Role of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve in strategic airlift capability.
   (*a*) Status of current participation.
   (*b*) Future availability of aircraft as to number and type.
9. Summary of subcommittee's recommendations on each of the foregoing major points.

I. Strategic Airlift Requirements and Capabilities

Any adequate consideration of this subject necessitates a clear understanding of the meaning of strategic airlift.

For the purpose of the subcommittee inquiry, strategic airlift is considered to be the long-range air movement of military passengers or cargo from points within the United States to oversea marshaling or staging areas, or between oversea staging areas.

Wartime airlift requirements are developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Annually, they call upon the commanders of the unified and specified commands, as well as the commanders of the services, to submit their wartime requirements for air transportation. Prior to October 15, 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not established approved requirements for airlift in support of either general or limited war. However, on that date, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached an agreed position on general war requirements.

In reaching its position, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had under consideration three assumed military situations:

1. Six months of mobilization followed by 60 days of general war;

2. General war, without warning or prior mobilization, D-Day and M-Day coinciding; and

3. The resumption of hostilities in Korea under a limited war situation.

A. 6 MONTHS OF MOBILIZATION FOLLOWED BY 60 DAYS OF GENERAL WAR

In considering the first assumption, general war after 6 months of mobilization, and equating those requirements against the strategic airlift capabilities of both the military and civil air fleets, the JCS concluded that the requirements could be met.

If there is validity in the assumption that any future war, be it general or limited, will be preceded by a mobilization period of 6 months, and if no importance is attached to the speed and range capability of the aircraft required in the military airlift, perhaps this conclusion would be valid.

But the subcommittee cannot foresee the luxury of a 6-month mobilization period. As a matter of fact, our most recent experiences in Lebanon and Formosa warn us to seriously question the validity of this assumption. In this connection it is pertinent to recall that the only reason that MATS was able to meet the timetable of the strategic airlift requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the Lebanon crisis was because a number of MATS aircraft were airborne in the vicinity of the European theater at the time of need and were thereby able to be immediately diverted from a peacetime mission to the JCS requirement. In the absence of the presence of these aircraft in the vicinity of Europe at the time of need, it would have been necessary to have assigned aircraft within the United States to the mission. Under those circumstances the ability of MATS to meet the JCS time requirement would have been degraded by days, rather than hours.

For the foregoing reasons, the subcommittee could not accept the validity of the JCS assumption for 6 months of mobilization followed by general war. As a consequence, the subcommittee did not pursue this assumption, but proceeded to the consideration of the two remaining assumptions: General war without warning, or the recurrence of limited war in Korea.

B. GENERAL WAR, WITHOUT WARNING

The Joints Chiefs of Staff having reached an agreed position with reference to the requirements for strategic airlift to support a general war, with D-Day and M-Day coinciding, it was then feasible to weigh against those requirements available airlift capabilities. In this consideration the total assets of the military air fleet, as well as the total capabilities of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), were applied.

In the preparation of the plan to meet these requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have designated specific time periods in which specified amounts of cargo and numbers of personnel must be airlifted. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff requirements extend over a period of 60 days, the subcommittee gave primary consideration to the first 20 days, because that represents the most critical period within the requirements.

The first 20 days have been divided into segments from D to D+5, D+6 to D+10, and D+11 to D+20. Within these specified periods of time, designated personnel and designated items of cargo must be airlifted by prearranged plan to predesignated places.

Certain of the personnel, as well as certain of the cargo items, have been determined to be of critical military importance and must therefore be airlifted exclusively in military aircraft under military control. Passengers and cargo determined to be within this critical category have been designated as "hard-core" requirements.

It must be recognized that the hard-core requirements to be airlifted in military aircraft comprise only a part of the total airlift requirements determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That portion of the traffic which has not been designated as "hard-core" to be moved in military aircraft is considered to be movable in either military or civil aircraft. Since the entire capacity of the military air fleet is consumed in the transportation of the hard-core requirements, it is obvious that the remaining military passengers and cargo within the JCS requirements must be moved in civil aircraft. While the subcommittee will make a definite recommendation for the creation of a strategic airlift capability within our Reserve components, that capability does not presently exist.

On the question of the adequacy of our airlift capability, the Deputy Secretary of Defense testified as follows:

> Including the Civil Reserve Air Reserve Air Fleet *as almost immediately effective*, our available lift is *marginally capable* of meeting wartime requirements under present plans. [Italic supplied.]

That view has support from some segments of the Air Force, with other segments of the Air Force disagreeing. The Chief of Staff of the Army disagreed. The Navy representative disagreed, and the Marine Corps representative stated that the strategic airlift capability was seriously inadequate.

It is the judgment of the subcommittee that the strategic airlift capability to meet the assumption under discussion is seriously inadequate, and, to the degree that security considerations will permit, will outline its reasons for such conclusion.

The total requirement to be airlifted consists of approximately 25 percent military personnel and 75 percent cargo. In each of the

three time periods designated, D to D+5, D+6 to D+10, and D+11 to D+20, there are deficiencies in both the passenger and cargo capability, which deficiencies increase as the period increases, with the maximum deficiencies, particularly in cargo, occurring in the critical period of D+11 to D+20. These deficiencies occur in spite of the assumption that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is almost immediately effective.

In January 1960 the assets of the 22 CRAF participants were 232 aircraft, of which 116 were cargo and 116 were passenger. As of April 13, 1960, with 20 CRAF participants, there were 231 aircraft in the worldwide total of CRAF, including 41 DC–4's, which is the oldest 4-engine aircraft today operational.

Furthermore, all of the present 20 participants in CRAF have not executed contracts which would make them liable to perform, even under a civil contract. In addition, the civil commitments of the CRAF participants practically assure that the CRAF fleet could not be "immediately effective," as envisaged in the assessment of the Deputy Secretary of Defense that our airlift capability is "marginally capable of meeting wartime requirements under present plans."

Any realistic assumption would presume some loss of aircraft, either through normal operational failures or to enemy action. No losses of civil or military aircraft, from either cause, are included in the present assumptions.

With the exception of the 58 passenger jets in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, as of April 13, and 31 C–133's in the current MATS fleet, THERE ARE NO MODERN AIRCRAFT IN EITHER FLEET.

This point becomes particularly important in considering the reaction capability of our total strategic airlift forces, and it becomes even more valid if there is no prepositioned equipment at the destination of the strategic airlift movement. In this event, the speed of the jet passenger aircraft would be completely meaningless in the airlift of tactical units of the Army, because the combat equipment and the troops must be moved in phase. The cargo would be largely allocated to the obsolescent aircraft available.

There is a general lack of understanding, or a total misunderstanding, of the allocation of military airlift to meet the hard-core requirements as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the general war plan which presumes war without notice. Security considerations preclude the restatement in this report of the precise facts on this point. However, it is considered consistent with security considerations to say that almost three-fourths of the entire capacity of the military fleet, including route support, is allocated to the support of the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command within the first 20 days of the conflict. Within the remaining capacity there is a negligible allocation of sorties to both the Army and the Navy during the same period of time. Obviously, under the plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 15, 1959, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps requirements are almost totally excluded from military airlift and must rely upon civil airlift augmentation to meet their responsibilities under the approved JCS requirements. But in Febru-

ary 1960 the President approved nine courses of action relating to military airlift. Item No. 1 was as follows:

1. That MATS be equipped and operated in peacetime to insure its capability to meet approved military hard-core[2] requirements in a general war and in situations short of general war, and such other military requirements as cannot be met adequately by commercial carriers on an effective and timely basis.

Footnote No. 2 is particularly pertinent.

On the basis of this expanded definition of "hard-core" requirements, including the addition of the term "tactical deployment," a reexamination of the categories of military passengers and cargoes currently required to be moved in military aircraft must be promptly accomplished. The subcommittee is pleased to note that the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have undertaken in a bilateral and cooperative manner the reappraisal of this matter. On the basis of the information available to the subcommittee, it is predicted that this reappraisal, when submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body, will result in a substantial increase, rather than any decrease, in the current "hard-core" airlift requirements.

It now becomes clear that there is no reallocation of aircraft to meet the requirements of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps under the assumptions of war being considered. On the other hand, practically the entire MATS fleet is preallocated to the use of the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command within the first 20-day critical period of such a war. Recognizing the vital importance of many of the other missions to be performed, the subcommittee is wholly unable to rationalize the preallocation of military strategic aircraft almost exclusively to Air Force requirements, to the exclusion of the requirements of the other services.

The foregoing facts and considerations constitute the basis of the subcommittee's conclusion that strategic airlift capability to support a general war without warning is seriously inadequate.

C. THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN KOREA, UNDER A LIMITED WAR SITUATION

While it is true that this assumption is approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for planning purposes, it must be emphasized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved no requirements for such an assumption. This means that the already approved requirement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, against which firm plans have been made, relates exclusively to the assumption of general war without warning (item B).

As in the case of assumption B, the subcommittee has concentrated its attention on the requirements and capabilities during the first 20 days of assumed conflict.

The principal complicating factor in an airlift to Korea is the distance involved. In all other respects the assumption of a resumption of hostilities in Korea includes many of the most favorable circum-

[2] Airlift requirements which must move in military aircraft, manned and operated by military crews because of the special military considerations, security, or because of limiting physical characteristics such as size or dangerous property. Included in this category are special military deployments involving nuclear retaliatory forces, the SAC poststrike recovery mission, *tactical deployments*, movements of missiles, special munitions, etc. [Italics supplied.]

stances that could be desired in a military situation. For instance, we have prepositioned combat units and equipment in Korea. A logistics system, including depots, supply lines, personnel, and all other requirements of a logistics system are currently in being. Adequate airfields are in being. Port facilities for resupply by surface craft are in being. An excellent maintenance and overhaul capability has been developed and is available within Japan.

These are some of the more critical requirements which would not be available if the conflict were waged in an area in which there was no prepositioned equipment.

In spite of all of these favorable elements, the testimony clearly developed the fact that the application of the total military and civil airlift to the military requirements produced serious shortages within the first 20 days. While security considerations prevent a statement as to the precise degree of those shortages, it is sufficient to say that the shortages in cargo exceeded the cargo shortage in the first 20 days of assumption B (general war without warning).

It is also pertinent to note that the planning for this contingency assumes that there were no other limited war requirements simultaneously existing in other areas of the world.

The subcommittee can see no good purpose in further belaboring this point. The facts speak for themselves.

II. Tactical Airlift

In order to obtain a well-rounded picture of the airlift problems the subcommittee devoted a portion of the hearings to requirements for the important adjunct of tactical airlift to overall airlift. Opportunity was afforded the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to present their requirements in this field as well as available capabilities.

Testimony presented to the subcommittee revealed that, primarily, the general and limited war mission of the regular Air Force troop carrier units of the Tactical Air Command, as viewed by the Air Force, is to support the movement of fighter and reconnaissance units to overseas objective areas. Once in the theater of operations, and after having discharged all Air Force requirements, these units will be committed to the troop carrier mission in the area. Reserve troop carrier units are committed to general war missions, some of which involve the air movement of Army units, personnel, supplies, and equipment.

Representatives of the Air Force testified that the tactical airlift in both the Regular and Reserve Air Force is adequate to fulfill the Army's requirements in number of aircraft, but does not meet the Army's stated requirements by type of aircraft or location. It is also clear that the present tactical airlift cannot meet the time frame requirement so vital to the Army.

With respect to the number and type of aircraft involved, the subcommittee noted that the majority of the troop carrier aircraft in the inventory of the Regular and Reserve Air Force are obsolete or obsolescent. There is a definite requirement for the immediate modernization of the tactical air fleet and increased emphasis on the development of the C–130C with boundary layer control which will replace the C–123 assault transport.

Adequate tactical airlift must be physically positioned in both the European and Pacific theaters to support the airborne assault of a minimum of one airborne battle group force in each theater. The immediate availability of this airlift will greatly enhance reaction time and insure rapid deployment of Army forces to counter aggression.

The bulk of the tactical air fleet consists of aircraft assigned to the Air Force Reserve. That part of this force which can be designated for Army use is composed almost entirely of obsolete C–119 aircraft. The active Air Force is equipped with the comparatively modern C–130A and the obsolescent C–123. Continuing emphasis must be placed on improving the operational readiness and immediate responsiveness of all Reserve units.

The Chief of Staff, USAF, stated, in his presentation on the problem areas to the subcommittee, that because of the many and varied situations in the event of a limited war contingency, the JSC have not attempted to prejudge strategic issues pertaining to the possible requirement for deployment of specific augmentation forces from the United States. Consequently, approved contingency plans contemplate using initially the strategically deployed forces in the overseas areas. Due to the short range of tactical aircraft and our worldwide commitments, such plans will require considerable augmentation and additional deployment of our tactical airlift fleet. The Army Chief of Staff testified that deployment plans are being implemented to the extent possible within the status of availability of existing aircraft.

The Marine Corps, whose organic airlift is designed primarily as tactical and intratheater, does, however, have plans for the movement of its troops from the continental United States to overseas areas. A modernization of the Marine Corps airlift is underway through the acquisition of 36 C–130B aircraft with a minimum inflight refueling capability. The Army has stated that it has no desire for its own organic airlift beyond the role designated to Army aviation within the combat area. It made clear, however, that this position is dependent upon specific assurances of the availability of adequate tactical airlift to meet its designated mission. In support of this position the Army Chief of Staff recommended the augmentation of the airlift pool by including some of the aircraft now in so-called private airlifts and a preplanning of the availability of aircraft when they are needed to include the designation of a responsible commander.

Exercise Big Slam-Puerto Pine, which was conducted during the subcommittee's hearings, developed, from the Army standpoint, some tangible experiences and deficiencies in the field of tactical airlift. Although the exercise was a training exercise designed as a strategic movement of troops and a portion of their equipment to a staging area, there was a followup stage involving plans for an airborne assault into a battle area utilizing hypothetical tactical assault aircraft. Final studies indicate the assault would have required the entire active TAC inventory.

These deficiencies were considered by the subcommittee to be of such importance that its recommendations for immediate purchase of an interim type of aircraft included a flexible model which can presently serve a strategic requirement and upon the advent of the SOR aircraft into the inventory it can be assigned to duty as tactical airlift. It is further recommended that the House Committee on Armed Services

survey these recommendations through the authority of section 412, Public Law 86–149, August 10, 1959, in a continuing effort to maintain a proper balance between our airlift capabilities and the other weapons provided the Armed Forces through the constitutional mandate placed upon the Congress to "raise and support Armies."

III. Other Airlift Resources

A. Strategic Support Squadrons (SSS).
B. Logistic Support Squadrons (LSS).
C. Miscellaneous transportation squadrons.
D. LOGAIR.
E. Quick-Trans.
F. Navy organic airlift.
G. Marine organic airlift.

A. STRATEGIC SUPPORT SQUADRONS

The Strategic Air Command includes more than one-quarter of a million persons and utilizes more than 3,000 aircraft. Its combat units are located at almost 100 airbases within and without the United States. It is the priority No. 1 retaliatory strike force of the United States and is our firstline deterrent force.

The logistic requirements for the support of this force are great. They include the constant movement and positioning of critical items of strategic weapons system equipment, weapons, electronic equipment, engines, and so forth. The Department of the Air Force and the Strategic Air Command have concluded that these logistic requirements necessitate an organic airlift. As a result there have been provided for SAC three Strategic Support Squadrons (SSS) to provide this transportation. The aircraft assigned to these squadrons are of the same type that are included within the common user fleet of MATS. However, these squadrons are organic to SAC and are not assigned to the common user pool of MATS.

While it is the Air Force position that the critical requirements of SAC justify the assignment of these aircraft to SAC, it is pertinent to note that the poststrike recovery mission of SAC, which the subcommittee deems to be equally critical, is assigned to MATS. As will be seen in the remaining discussion on this point, practically every major command in the Air Force, as well as organizations within the other services, have acquired their own private airlift. The noteworthy exception is the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), which is totally dependent on non-Army sources for its air support, whether it be strategic, tactical, or logistic.

B. LOGISTIC SUPPORT SQUADRONS

The Air Materiel Command has the responsibility to store, maintain, and modify special weapons for the Air Force and the Department of Defense. To perform this mission, AMC receives the weapons out of production and becomes their caretaker at all times except when they are in the hands of a combat unit.

AMC provides worldwide special weapons support to the Strategic Air Command, the Air Defense Command, and other overseas theater

forces. Each of these forces has its specially configured weapons to meet its peculiar combat needs. AMC has the task to supply the right weapon, at the right place, at the right time. This is the mission of the AMC's Logistic Support Squadrons (LSS).

The principal difference between the strategic support squadrons and the logistic support squadrons is that the latter primarily transports special weapons to the overseas areas, while the strategic support squadrons handle the movement of SAC weapons within the continental United States.

So, it becomes obvious that the logistic support squadrons are performing a strategic airlift mission in substantially the same manner as is required of MATS. It is further evident that this situation has produced a junior AMC within the Air Materiel Command and with its own organic airlift.

C. MISCELLANEOUS TRANSPORTATION SQUADRONS

There are 387 additional transport type aircraft being used by the Air Force in miscellaneous transportation functions. Except for a limited number of C–133's and C–130's, these aircraft have been withdrawn from primary organized airlift units because of their age and uneconomical supportability in such a high utilization role. Although these aircraft are not compatable with a modern military airlift system, they are performing highly essential tasks in support of other military requirements. Some of these tasks are:

1. Tests by the Air Research and Development Command.
2. Intracommand, or intratheater operations, requiring 258 aircraft.
3. Rescue units, primarily on island stations or in Arctic areas are using 35 SC–54 aircraft.
4. Electronic countermeasure training platforms requiring 8 aircraft.
5. The remaining aircraft in this category are in Air Materiel Command depot maintenance activities, undergoing major inspection, modification, or crash-damage repair.

In view of the age and type of the great majority of the airplanes in this category (C–47's and C–54's), as well as the type of activities to which they are assigned, the subcommittee does not consider their inclusion in the subject of adequacy of national airlift to be of any importance.

D. LOGAIR

LOGAIR is a commercial air cargo service procured by the Air Force through MATS for the Air Materiel Command.

Approximately 85 percent of the technical type items of aircraft present a sporadic issue problem at the base level. Since it is uneconomical for the supply element of a squadron or wing to remain completely self-sufficient for these higher cost items on which there is a rare or low demand, resupply of these items is accomplished by LOGAIR. This permits reductions in pipeline items and cutbacks in procurement.

Department of Defense policy states that commercial transportation service will be employed for the movement of personnel and things within the United States when such service is available or readily

obtainable and satisfactorily capable of meeting military requirements. Pursuant thereto, LOGAIR was established as a commercial operation to provide a logistical support airlift, operating bases at aerial ports of embarkation. This airlift service is procured on a competitive bid basis for a period of 1 year.

The subcommittee does not consider this type of commercial airlift service, confined to the United States, to be of significance in the consideration of the broader questions involved in the adequacy or inadequacy of national airlift.

E. QUICK-TRANS

Quick-Trans is a commercial contract cargo airlift designed to provide, within the continental United States, a specialized premium service, with fast reaction, to Navy and Marine Corps demands for expedited transportation. It is also available to the other Services as required.

It provides rapid, flexible, responsive and economical service that meets special priority transportation needs of the Navy.

This commercial cargo airlift provides service to 16 points of concentrated Navy interest, ties together the continental United States Navy supply complex, and links the Navy supply activities with overseas aerial ports of embarkation. It is the only all-cargo airlift service available at many of the points served.

The contractor currently provides the required airlift service with eight C–54 (DC–4) all-cargo aircraft.

For the same reason cited in discussing LOGAIR, the subcommittee does not consider this commercial cargo service to have any particular significance to the consideration of the adequacy or inadequacy of strategic national airlift.

F. NAVY ORGANIC AIRLIFT

Navy organic airlift is designed primarily to serve those needs of the Navy which are unique to the Navy. Fleet organic airlift, therefore, is provided for fleet tactical support squadrons which are integral parts of the fleet commands to be supported. They are instantly responsive to the commander's requirements and are trained and equipped to meet the peculiar needs of the command. The tasks to be performed by this type of airlift are:

1. The supply and resupply of nuclear weapons.
2. The delivery of personnel and materiel to bases not served by other means.
3. The deployment of specialized units.
4. Air evacuation.
5. Command and administrative functions.

The aircraft requirements for this airlift fall into two broad categories:

1. Long-range transport aircraft not requiring an aircraft carrier capability, and
2. Medium-range aircraft suitable for operations on aircraft carriers.

The number and type of aircraft assigned to this mission are 17 R–6D's (DC–6 or C–118), and 45 R–5D's (DC–4 or C–54).

There are 35 R–5D's assigned to the reserve squadrons.

The Navy advises that its wartime requirement for this type of aircraft is 75. The carrier-on-deck mission requires a relatively short-ranged aircraft. The requirement is for 48. The Navy currently has 32, the Grumman TF–1.

The validity of this organic airlift capability within the Navy, excluding the carrier-on-deck mission, should be considered in connection with the logistic support squadrons and the strategic support squadrons.

G. MARINE CORPS ORGANIC AIRLIFT

The Marine Corps states that it has a requirement for organic airlift in order that it may have the ability to deploy under one commander all of the ground and aviation components required to sustain combat in the performance of its missions. Within its five air functions, service support is the principal mission of Marine Corps organic airlift.

The service support function includes the following tasks:

1. To provide helicopter type airlift required by the Fleet Marine forces for vertical assault and for air evacuation.
2. Provide the fixed-wing transports required for movement of high priority land force cargo and personnel within the amphibious objective area (including air evacuation).

It is the second task that requires the Marine Corps to maintain its assault and transport squadrons. These squadrons are trained with and are directly responsive to the landing force commander.

At present a total of 60 aircraft, R–4Q's and R–4D's, are assigned to this mission. These aircraft are not suitable for long-range, overwater airlift. They are obsolete and are already scheduled to be replaced by the GV–1, the Navy version of the C–130B.

The GV–1 will be phased into Marine inventories during 1961 to 1963. By the latter date 3 squadrons of 12 aircraft each, a total of 36 aircraft, will be in the inventory. This will reduce the present inventory from 60 obsolete aircraft to 36 modern troop assault aircraft.

Basically, the mission involved and type of aircraft provided more nearly relate to the functions of the Tactical Air Command than to any concept of strategic airlift, and such further consideration as the subcommittee shall give to this matter will be on that basis.

IV. Military Air Transport Service

The mission of the Military Air Transport Service is to maintain, in being, the military air transport forces, service forces, en route bases, and air routes to meet the approved wartime requirements of the Department of Defense, as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further, MATS is required to train, to maintain a state of readiness, and while training airlift cargo, personnel, patients, and mail according to Department of Defense directives.

The various components of MATS must be "forces in being" as an indispensable prerequisite to meeting the approved wartime requirements as laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In section I of this report there is discussed the wartime airlift requirements approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a consequence,

those details will not be repeated in the discussion of MATS, but are referred to in justification of the subcommittee's conclusions as to the inadequacy of MATS to meet its assigned mission.

Perhaps the two most controversial points which are raised with reference to MATS are the procurement practices, as discussed in section VI, and the utilization rate of MATS aircraft in the performance of the peacetime mission.

Comparisons have been made of the MATS peacetime utilization rate with those of SAC, TAC, and other commands. These other commands have a surge requirement during the early days of general war which differs by each type of aircraft and varies from three to eight times their peacetime training rate. The combat airplanes of these commands operate on a sortie basis. On the other hand, MATS airplanes are required to sustain a round-the-clock, 7-day-a-week operation to insure logistic backup required by our overseas fighting forces.

The manpower, equipment, and other resources presently available permitted MATS, in the Big Slam airlift exercise, to successfully achieve and maintain for 2 weeks the planned wartime utilization rate of these aircraft. During that 2-week period, personnel were required to work 12 hours a day for 2 weeks, or a rate of 84 hours per week. In its peacetime operation, MATS is manned to the point that about a 44-hour workweek is normal for all support and operating personnel.

It must be recognized that MATS consists of more than several hundred airplanes, their crews, and support elements. MATS is a system and one which the subcommittee considers to be a weapons system which is vital to military requirements. Included in the system are all elements of the airlift forces including personnel worldwide, i.e., air crews, ground crews, maintenance, supply traffic, management personnel, and physical resources. All of these elements must be so trained as to permit a surge from the peacetime to the wartime rate, and sustained operations thereafter for a protracted emergency period.

Some witnesses from civil aviation have suggested that the current utilization rate of approximately 5 hours is grossly excessive and that a shorter daily utilization rate would be completely adequate. Of course, the fewer the hours which MATS craft are permitted to fly in peacetime, the greater the traffic which must be hauled in civil aircraft. The subcommittee does not criticize the representatives of civil aviation in their desire for more business. That is the reason for their existence—business at a profit. On the other hand, it is the responsibility of the subcommittee to determine the nature of a military requirement and then tailor the capability to that requirement. It is on that basis that the subcommittee has earnestly sought to find a utilization rate which will insure the readiness of MATS to meet the wartime requirement, insure realistic training and economical utilization of the system during training flights and, at the same time, restrict MATS from participating in unwarranted commercial-type activities.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, when questioned on this point, stated that the peacetime daily utilization rate of MATS aircraft should be at least one-half of their wartime surge rate requirement. That would place the minimum at 4 hours daily utilization for the current common user fleet of MATS. This simply means that the

troop carrier aircraft in MATS and the C–133's can and do have a daily utilization rate which is less than that of the remainder of the MATS fleet. General White also testified that a proper rate might well be more than his suggested minimum of 4 hours. He stated that it might well be 4½ hours, or some figure in that general area.

The subcommittee requested information as to the specific activities which were conducted in the performance of the current 5-hour utilization rate of MATS aircraft. Excluding troop carrier aircraft, of which there are 108 in the MATS fleet, the breakdown was as follows:

	Hours
Test and local training	0.8
Special missions	1.1
Exercises	.2
Remote, outsize, dangerous cargo, air evacuation	1.0
All other utilization	1.9

From the foregoing it can be seen that 3.1 hours of the current 5-hour utilization rate is absorbed in activities which are hardly subject to criticism. It was suggested that aircraft flying to "remote" stations or areas, included flights to the airbase at Thule, Greenland. MATS agreed that this was true. However, MATS also pointed out that no civil carrier on the east coast of the United States is certificated to fly that route from an east coast base where all MATS traffic to that base is generated. It was further pointed out that extreme weather conditions, which often prevail at Thule, ground aircraft for extended periods of time. It is difficult for the subcommittee to conceive why any civil air carrier, which must operate for a profit, would wish to risk such hazardous conditions in a commercial enterprise. Thus, in the subcommittee's view the controversy over the daily utilization rate narrows to the question of the civil eligible traffic which is transported in MATS aircraft during the 1.9 hours which are utilized in the "all other" category.

MATS has taken the position that it must fly its aircraft in the common user fleet at a rate of 5 hours per day in order to be able to attain its surge rate under wartime conditions. Therefore, it says that it must fly this additional 1.9 hours daily as a part of the 5-hour requirement. So, the question then arises as to the conditions under which this time will be flown. There is one of three things which could be done: The planes could stand idle, they could fly empty, or they could fly with dummy loads. If the planes were to fly empty or with dummy loads, no portion of the MATS system would be exercised except the aircraft crews and limited maintenance. Thus training would be degraded. If the planes were not to fly at all, it would degrade all parts of the system.

In lieu of any of the three foregoing possibilities, MATS, operating under the Department of Defense directive to operate economically and to enhance the training of the system, has moved civil eligible cargo and passengers to various points throughout the world, both over scheduled and nonscheduled routes. That portion of the civil eligible traffic which cannot be moved by MATS within this 1.9-hour segment of its daily utilization rate constitutes the traffic which is currently contracted to civil air carriers under the advertised competitive bidding process. It is this traffic which is the subject of the $85 million congressional set-aside for fiscal 1961 and the $80 million congressional set-aside projected for fiscal 1962.

The subcommittee was unable to arrive at any precise daily utilization rate. But since the subcommittee is charged with the responsibility of determining the adequacy or inadequacy of the national airlift as it relates to military requirements, the subcommittee elects to rely upon military judgment. As a consequence, the subcommittee feels that the daily utilization rate for the common user portion of the MATS fleet, as presently configured, should be not less than one-half of the sustained surge rate necessary to meet wartime requirements.

The numbers and types of aircraft in the current MATS fleet have been fully discussed in other sections of this report. The subcommittee's recommendation in this regard is embodied in section 7 of the summary at the conclusion of this report.

V. Civil Reserve Air Fleet

The mission of the civil reserve air fleet is to assist MATS in meeting wartime airlift requirements. The CRAF plan is a civil contract operation. All elements of the program are covered by contractual arrangements between the Air Force and civil carriers.

The military requirement for the civil reserve air fleet includes approximately 75 percent of the total military personnel requirement. The subcommittee found adequate and modern capacity existing in CRAF for this task. The passenger fleet of 98 aircraft includes 52 modern jet passenger aircraft, the remaining 46 aircraft being propeller driven. This was the configuration of the passenger fleet as of May 1, 1960. In the very near future essentially all of the CRAF passenger requirement will be satisfied by modern jet aircraft.

In the cargo area the CRAF capability is not only grossly inadequate in terms of capacity, but it is limited and outmoded in terms of equipment. The CRAF cargo capability is limited to 126 converted passenger aircraft, approximately one-third of which are the obsolete DC–4's. The remaining equipment consists of DC–6's, DC–7's, and 1049–H's. There is not a single aircraft in CRAF's cargo fleet which was specifically designed for cargo operations. It is this gross deficiency which gives rise to an overriding requirement that new, turbine-powered cargo aircraft be procured by the civil carriers who participate in CRAF and that there be created an incentive for such participation.

As has been stated in other portions of this report, the current responsiveness of CRAF participants is based upon a civil contract and the patriotism of the personnel of the participating companies.

While accepting without question the patriotism of the individuals concerned, the subcommittee is convinced that reliance on the present contractual arrangement, without some further statutory guarantee, short of militarizing CRAF, is unacceptable. In this connection it should be noted that the Chief of Staff of the Air Forces was requested to express his view as to whether or not it would be desirable to enact legislation which would make CRAF, together with its assets and personnel, an auxiliary of the Air Force. This is perhaps as close to a military relationship as could be provided by legislation without actually conferring military status. General White expressed opposition to making CRAF an auxiliary of the Air Force. He expressed such opposition in spite of the desire of all military commanders, who

have spoken openly on this subject, that CRAF should be completely responsive to military control. The subcommittee has concluded that legislative action which would increase the current authority of the President is desirable, a specific recommendation on this point being included in the summary of recommendations.

In recommending legislation, the subcommittee is mindful that present arrangements for the callup of CRAF provide only for activation under general war conditions, or a situation short of general war when required by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Companies that could be involved in a partial activation could well be unwilling to participate in CRAF due to their concern for maintaining their competitive commercial position. There has been no development to meet partial CRAF activation, and there is no existing legislation to support a callup of CRAF short of a declared national emergency or war. The legislation proposed by the subcommittee, if enacted by the Congress, will meet that deficiency.

As previously stated, it is the judgment of the subcommittee that, except for its modern jet passenger capacity, the current configuration of the CRAF, both as to numbers and types, is wholly inadequate. This fact stems largely from the situation which currently prevails in civil aviation. The demand has been for modern jet passenger airplanes and it is accurate to say that this modern capacity has been developed in response to a civilian need and demand. It has not depended in any degree upon any known military requirements. At the same time, the development of a civil air cargo capability has scarcely begun. The subcommittee has received statements that only one-tenth of 1 percent of the cargo currently moved within continental United States is moved by commercial cargo air carriers. It is further stated that, if this demand were increased to only 1 percent of all cargo moved in civil channels, 36 times more cargo would be moved in civil cargo aircraft. This is the clear evidence that passenger traffic has been highly developed, while cargo capability and traffic remain for future development. This clearly points up the reason why there are no modern cargo aircraft in the civil air fleet today.

Throughout its hearings the subcommittee attempted to determine the incentive for any civil carrier to be a participant in CRAF. It was recognized that all of the traffic which these CRAF participants haul under MATS contract was under the competitive bidding practice which practically all of them condemned. Perhaps the most straightforward reason given for participation was the fact that they anticipated that their aircraft would be requisitioned or otherwise acquired by the Government in the event of war and participation in CRAF at the present time would simply give them a more orderly way to operate in wartime.

In view of the negligible modern cargo capacity among civil carriers, the lack of incentive to participate in CRAF, and the lack of responsiveness of CRAF, the subcommittee concluded that participation in CRAF should be under more meaningful requirements. It further concluded that an incentive should be provided for such participation by providing a more profitable rate for the transportation of civil eligible traffic by CRAF participants in peacetime.

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The interest of small business has been fully considered in connection with the recommended composition of the CRAF, as well as the procurement policy governing the procurement of civil augmentation airlift. Under the prevailing definition of small business, as it applies to this industry, companies which have an average of less than 1,000 employees during any one year qualify as "small business" within that year. At the present time more than half of the participants in CRAF qualify as "small business" under the foregoing definition. On the procurement side, those companies which qualify as small business have received 100 percent of the competitive bid contracts awarded by MATS within this fiscal year.

There can be no doubt that implementation of the subcommittee's recommendation as to the requirements for CRAF participation will substantially alter the current composition of CRAF. In addition, under the proposed procurement revisions which would restrict procurement to CRAF participants, numerous individuals or firms on the current bidders list will be precluded. It is fully recognized that the subcommittee's recommendations on this point will result in numerous protests. But, the subcommittee underscores the fact that its responsibility is to meet a military requirement, not to insure a profit for those segments of the civil aviation industry which contribute nothing to the creation of a strategic cargo airlift capability in the civil aviation industry.

The subcommittee's recommendations with reference to legislation and requirements for CRAF participation are contained in recommendation No. 4 of the summary of this report. The recommendation with reference to improving procurement practices is included in recommendation No. 6 in the summary of this report.

VI. Airlift Procurement Practices

The Secretary of the Air Force has been appointed the single manager for airlift services for all agencies of the Department of Defense. The commander of MATS has been designated executive director of the airlift agency. He has the responsibility for procuring commercial airlift for the Department of Defense in the United States and oversea areas. There is one exception. Within the United States, the Military Traffic Management Agency, which is administered by the Army, procures charter passenger airlift for periods of up to 90 days for the Department of Defense, while MATS procures all airlift which extends for more than a 90-day period.

Department of Defense instructions provide that efficient and economic utilization of military transportation resources will be made prior to the employment of overseas commercial air transportation. Operating under that direction, the Military Air Transport Service has procured all of its civil augmentation airlift on a competitive bid basis. Herein lies the heart of all the controversy which has been generated over the procurement practices of MATS. The subcommittee notes that the implementation of this Department of Defense instruction by MATS has made MATS the "whipping boy" of the civil aviation transport industry and various segments of Congress.

MATS makes maximum use of 1-year competitive, fixed-price contracts, and, in so doing, observes a 40-percent set-aside for small business.

In fiscal 1959 the Congress appropriated and reserved $80 million for this purpose and MATS obligated $70.4 million, returning $9.6 million to the Treasury.

In fiscal 1960 the Congress appropriated and reserved $85 million. This was set aside for the specific purpose of supporting the procurement of civil airlift by MATS and in no sense does it represent the total sums spent by the Department of Defense in procuring civil air transportation. As a mater of fact, in addition to the $70.4 million obligated by MATS on a competitive bid basis, the Department of Defense spent an additional sum of $160 million with civil airlines at common-carriage rates.

The most recent information indicates that MATS will obligate approximately $63 million of the $85 million set aside in fiscal 1960. For fiscal 1961 it is pertinent to note that the House Appropriations Committee has approved a set-aside of $80 million for this purpose.

The number of bidders competing for MATS civil airlift business has steadily increased. While the number of bidders on the list varies slightly from time to time, there are more than 90 bidders on the current bidders list. These 90 bidders include all segments of civil transport aviation, from the largest national and international carriers to the person who has nothing more than a lease for an airplane and two technical manuals covering the maintenance and operation of that plane. The type of aircraft varies from the latest to the most ancient, the latter class including C–47's and C–54's.

It is also important to note that there are a number of participants in the CRAF program who have elected not to compete for this business, even though they are on the bidders list.

So it is obvious that one thing, and one thing only, results from this procurement practice: The traffic is being airlifted at the lowest possible rate. But it produces no incentive whatsoever to the established segments of the civil aviation industry to improve the quality of their aircraft.

While the subcommittee recognizes that this procurement practice of MATS is performed pursuant to instructions from the Department of Defense, it must express its dissatisfaction with the practice. The view of the subcommittee is predicated upon the fact that the type of cargo aircraft available in the civil aviation inventory does not meet the desired military requirement. The subcommittee concludes that the current competitive bid practice must be displaced by a method of procurement which will make it economically feasible for those who participate in CRAF to procure the type of modern cargo aircraft required to meet the military mission.

In addition to the type of procurement to be employed, it is necessary to consider the type of business to be contracted. This question involves the so-called channel traffic currently transported by MATS. Channel traffic is that traffic which is transported over aerial routes which parallel precisely or substantially the aerial routes traversed by overseas certificated carriers.

The subcommittee is mindful of the fact that in the event of hostilities MATS aircraft, as well as civil aircraft that are supporting the military mission, must travel these channel routes. As a consequence, the subcommittee can see no validity in the urging that MATS must be required to abandon its channel route traffic. While the degree of degradation will remain debatable, there can be no doubt that to pre-

clude such movements by MATS aircraft would degrade the MATS readiness capability in some degree.

Rather than be concerned with the routes over which the traffic must be moved, it is the judgment of the subcommittee that the most important objective to be obtained in the area of procurement practices is to insure that the traffic to be moved in civil aircraft is moved at fair and reasonable rates. Having concluded that the current competitive rates do nothing to enhance the civil aircraft cargo capability, the subcommittee concludes that a proper course of action would be the negotiation of a fair and reasonable rate. There is ample authority under existing law for this purpose.

The subcommittee is mindful that the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 states it to be the policy of Congress that military procurement shall be accomplished on an advertised competitive bid basis. Therefore, a subcommittee recommendation to substitute negotiated procurement for advertised procurement must be justified on the basis of military necessity. If the initial procurement of civil augmentation airlift is limited to CRAF participants, as will be recommended by the subcommittee, the number of competitors will be greatly reduced but still include both large and small business segments of the civil aviation industry. With the reduced number of competitors, it is entirely possible that advertised competitive bidding among these participants may produce a rate which is fair and reasonable, both to the Government and the bidder. Therefore, the subcommittee feels that competitive procurement should be followed unless and until it is determined that fair and reasonable rates do not result from this method of procurement.

As evidence of the current situation, it is noted that the lowest commercial carriage rate for the transportation of passengers from the United States to Europe is approximately $255. Under competitive-bid procurement the same passenger fare has been less than $80. A responsible company with substantial inventories and an airlines system simply cannot compete for this military passenger traffic on a profitable basis.

The subcommittee has no thought that any negotiated rate, if negotiation should be required, will even approximate the lowest common carriage rate currently available. In addition, and with full respect to the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Government regulatory agency on airline rate structures, the subcommittee perceives no requirement for approval by CAB of such rate as may be negotiated by MATS.

The subcommittee's conclusions on procurement practices are directly related to the subcommittee's conclusions on the composition of the civil reserve air fleet and the recommended requirements for participation therein.

The subcommittee's specific recommendations on these points are contained in section 6 of the summary of the subcommittee's recommendations at the conclusion of this report.

VII. Modernization of MATS

The 483 currently assigned strategic transport aircraft of MATS are divided into the following types:

One hundred and seven C–118's: This is a military cargo version of the commercial Douglas C–6A.

Fifty-six C–121's: The military counterpart of the Lockheed Superconstellation.

Each of the foregoing types of aircraft is an adaptation of a commercial model. They are basically structured and stressed for the loading and airlifting of cargo, and they are also readily convertible for the carriage of personnel and litter patients.

The present—workhorses—of the strategic airlift force are the 291 Douglas C–124 Globemasters. Built as a cargo transport, this aircraft first flew in 1948 and has no counterpart in the civil air fleet.

Currently, 36 of these aircraft, although assigned to MATS, are located overseas under the operational control of the oversea commanders and could not be readily responsive to a strategic airlift movement from the United States.

Newest in the MATS force, and the only type which can be classified as modern, are 31 C–133 Cargomasters. A cargo carrier exclusively, the C–133 is powered by turbine-prop engines; all of the other aircraft in the force are piston driven. The C–133, which has no equivalent in the civil inventory, has carried the 90-foot Titan intercontinental ballistic missile, and has lifted a record load of 59 tons. There will ultimately be 50 of these aircraft in MATS, the remaining 19 airplanes already being in production. The prime use of the C–133 is the transportation of outsize items of military equipment, for which there is no other capability in either the military or civil fleets.

By any reasonable standard, 452 of the 483 aircraft in MATS' strategic inventory, while still able to perform a useful service, are obsolescent. The C–124's, which constitute the backbone of the fleet, are from 7 to 10 years old, and responsible witnesses who are knowledgeable in this field have advised the subcommittee that the maximum useful life remaining in these aircraft is approximately 5 years. With the exception of the C–133's, a similar assessment of the remaining useful life of the remainder of the MATS fleet would be valid.

This situation results from the fact that all of the aircraft in the MATS inventory must be procured by the Air Force. Therefore, the requirement for new aircraft in MATS must compete with other Air Force priorities for the allocation of Defense dollars available to the Air Force. It now becomes obvious that responsible Air Force authorities have been unwilling to place the requirement for new aircraft for MATS, both as to type and numbers, sufficiently high on the Air Force priority list to be funded.

Upon the development of the foregoing information, and bearing in mind the facts which were developed in the discussion of strategic airlift requirements and capabilities, in support of general war (D-day and M-day coinciding), the subcommittee concluded that unless immediate action were taken to improve the MATS fleet the Nation would find itself in a position of unacceptable risk within a period of 5 years.

During the course of its hearings, the subcommittee received testimony from the Air Force with reference to the development of a new, turbine-powered, uncompromised cargo aircraft. The desired operational characteristics of such a new airplane had been embodied in a "Specific Operational Requirement" developed by the Air Force. Thus the current reference to the SOR aircraft.

When it is recognized that most of the current MATS fleet must rely upon island bases in airlifting meaningful loads either across the

Atlantic or the Pacific, and that the use of those island bases might be denied by enemy action in the event of hostilities, the need for a new jet cargo aircraft with transoceanic range is obvious.

The development of the aircraft is fully supported by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, each of the military services, each of the nonmilitary governmental agencies which were represented during the hearings, and, in addition, most of the industry witnesses who testified.

At the conclusion of its second week of testimony, the subcommittee concluded that immediate action was required, both as to the long-range aircraft program for MATS as well as interim measures. The subcommittee was mindful that the House Committee on Appropriations had under active consideration the Defense budget requests for fiscal 1961. Therefore, the subcommittee adopted a motion that the chairman of the subcommittee be authorized to appear before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee to support the $50 million budget item to begin the development of the SOR aircraft and to support a program of interim modernization through the procurement of currently available aircraft, commonly referred to as "off the shelf" aircraft.

Pursuant to the direction of the subcommittee, its chairman, Mr. Rivers, appeared before the Mahon subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on March 30, 1960. During that presentation the appropriation of $50 million to begin the development of the SOR aircraft was urged as a matter of first priority.

For interim modernization, Chairman Rivers supported a program which included the procurement of 100 "off the shelf" aircraft, 50 C–135's or equivalent, 50 130–B's or equivalent, with extended range, this latter model of aircraft now being designated the C–130E.

The subcommittee fully appreciated the fact that it was not within its area of responsibility, propriety, or technical competence to select specific aircraft for specific military mssions. Therefore, in formulating its judgment on this point, the subcommittee freely sought and was given the best military information available on this subject. The subcommittee acted on the military recommendations received, and not on its own judgment. The sole interest of the subcommittee in this matter related to the availability, cost, and performance of the types of aircraft currently available, and had no reference to the source of procurement.

The best information available to the subcommittee clearly indicated that the type of aircraft recommended would be available sooner and at less cost than any other turbine-powered aircraft available on an "off the shelf" basis. It was also foremost in the subcommittee's thinking that these aircraft should be assigned, when available, to the Strategic Air Command in support of the poststrike recovery mission of SAC. In this connecttion, the subcommittee was mindful of the woeful inadequacy of currently assigned aircraft of MATS to perform this mission. The number of aircraft recommended would have accommodated this requirement.

Some fear continues to be expressed in various quarters that if this type of aircraft were procured for the MATS inventory that it would be used for purposes other than the hard-core requirements. The subcommittee does not subscribe to that thought and fully intends that these aircraft be austere, with emphasis on a cargo configuration, but with the flexibility to move military personnel, the latter being a portion of the poststrike recovery mission.

In recommending the procurement of 50 C–130–E's, or equivalent type, the subcommittee was persuaded by its availability as well as the existence of its predecessor in the inventory of the Tactical Air Command, the C–130–B. By equipping the B model with pylon fuel tanks, the aircraft will have a strategic capability. As to its performance, it will transport a greater load on a nonstop intercontinental flight, and at greatly increased speed, than the current C–124 in the MATS inventory. It has not only a troop and cargo lift capability, but an airdrop capability for both troops and cargo. As a consequence, the E model will have the capability of both a strategic and a combat assault aircraft. Such flexibility is particularly attractive to the Army. A combination of all of these factors prompted the decision to accept the military recommendations for the procurement of this specific type of airplane on an interim modernization basis.

The question now arises as to how many aircraft are to be included in the MATS fleet, as the permanent and interim programs are implemented. As has been previously stated in this report, the numbers and configuration of the planes in the current MATS fleet are based upon the hard core requirements as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There are no aircraft in MATS surplus to that requirement.

Obviously, when aircraft of greater capacity and greater speed become available, the size of the MATS fleet can and will be reduced. The precise number of aircraft must continue to be related to the hard core requirements. These requirements are currently under review with a strong likelihood that they will be increased, both from the standpoint of the Army and the Tactical Air Command. As a consequence, it is not presently possible to state the precise number of aircraft that will be required. The subcommittee can only reiterate its firm contention that the size of the fleet be restricted to the movement of the hard core requirements.

In view of the magnitude of the sums of money that would be required to develop a self-sufficient strategic airlift capability, wholly within the military services, the subcommittee foresees no likelihood that the strategic airlift capability within the military will exceed that necessary to airlift the hard core requirements.

The subcommittee's recommendation on MATS modernization, interim and long-range, is included in section 7 of the "Summary of Recommendations."

VIII. Role of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve in Strategic Airlift Capability

When the subcommittee began its hearings on March 8, 1960, action had already been taken within the Air Force to create a strategic airlift capability in the Air National Guard. This action resulted from the availability of a number of C–97's.

For an extended period of time the KC–97 was the principal aerial tanker available to the Strategic Air Command. It is being replaced with the KC–135, a jet aerial tanker which is compatible with the jet bombers which it must refuel. As this transition occurs, the KC–97's become excess to SAC requirements and are being phased out of the active inventory. In addition, a small number of C–97's have been phased out of the MATS inventory. As a result, 48 C–97's have been transferred to the Air National Guard. Personnel of the Air National Guard have been undergoing transitional training. Since the personnel undergoing this transitional training in C–97's have, until recently, been engaged in the operation of jet fighters in connection with the air defense mission, the subcommittee was gratified to learn that they have completed the transitional training in record time and with an outstanding record of performance.

The participation of the Air National Guard in the air defense mission continues to decline. As a consequence, a number of units are becoming available for transitional training from the fighter type to the C–97's. In view of the outstanding record which the Air National Guard has established in the performance of its air defense mission, the subcommittee fully anticipates a similar record of performance in this new mission.

During the course of its hearings, the subcommittee became aware of the fact that an additional number, approximately 45 KC–97's, had become excess to SAC requirements and had been placed in open storage in Arizona preparatory to being cannibalized. In view of the need to create a reserve capability for strategic airlift in the reserve components of the Air Force, and in view of the obvious ability of reserve components to assume this responsibility, the subcommittee requested the Secretary of the Air Force to defer the disposal of the KC–97's in open storage until it could pass judgment upon the feasibility of having them transferred to the Air National Guard. Subsequently, it was determined that the models in storage were A models, the oldest in the entire inventory of this type of aircraft. It also learned that later models of this aircraft, which are still in the SAC inventory, will become surplus to SAC's requirements in the relatively near future. In view of the fact that the A model is already an obsolescent airplane, it was considered prudent for the subcommittee to withdraw its deferral request to the Secretary of the Air Force and await the availability of the later models for transfer to the Reserve components. The Secretary was so notified.

Initially, the subcommittee's consideration was restricted to a modification of the KC–97 to a C–97. This simply consisted of removing the tanker capacity and refueling equipment from the aircraft. On a contract basis this could be accomplished at a cost of $19,000 per aircraft. But the modification is not complicated and can probably be accomplished by the Reserve components within their own capabilities and at practically no cost.

The creation of this capability within the Reserve components of the Air Force has dual significance, it will provide a backup strategic airlift capability for MATS, and it will produce a strategic airlift capability for the Army National Guard.

It is the judgment of the subcommittee that additional C–97 squadrons should be established within the Air National Guard. The sub-

committee also foresees the availability of some C–124's, and it is the judgment of the subcommittee that an operational capability of this aircraft should be established in either the Air Force National Guard or the Air Reserve. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the Air Force Reserve currently has a tactical air capability, using C–119 aircraft, while the Air National Guard has heretofore had the air defense capability, operating the fighter-interceptor aircraft.

The subcommittee has reached one additional conclusion as a result of the Puerto Pine Big Slam airlift operation to Puerto Rico. In that operation a substantial problem was encountered in connection with the supply of aviation fuel. The problem was solved by the use of a new portable fuel supply system developed by the Marine Corps. This new simplified system was transported to Roosevelt Roads, assembled in a matter of hours, including the laying of over 2 miles of flexible pipeline, to the tanks. Had a requirement for this system arisen at an inland area, the fuel supply could not have been made available by surface craft. Aerial supply of fuel requirements would then have become a necessity.

Military officials were highly impressed with this new simplified fuel storage facility developed by the Marine Corps. Its requirement in inland areas is not only possible but probable. As a consequence, there should be maintained a capability for aerial supply of such units. This can be accomplished, at minimum cost, by the transfer of an appropriate number of KC–97's, in their tanker configuration, to either the Air National Guard or the Air Reserve, and the subcommittee so recommends.

IX. Summary of Subcommittee's Recommendations

1. Strategic airlift requirements and capabilities

The subcommittee concludes that within the first 20 days of either general war, without warning, or limited war under any current assumptions for planning purposes, that strategic airlift capabilities are seriously inadequate. The subcommittee further concludes that three courses of action should be implemented to overcome these deficiencies:

(1) A new, uncompromised turbine-powered cargo aircraft should be developed and such aircraft should, to the maximum extent possible, be compatible with the economic transportation of civilian cargo by civil airlines.

(2) That the current MATS fleet be modernized, with the exception of 50 C–133's which are available or on procurement; that such modernization be on both an interim basis, through the procurement of currently available "off-the-shelf" aircraft, and through the acquisition of production line models of the SOR aircraft referred to in subparagraph (1). The specific recommendations of the subcommittee with reference to numbers and types of aircraft for interim modernization are contained in recommendation No. 7.

(3) That the CRAF capability be similarly upgraded through the acquisition of modern, long-range, turbine-powered cargo aircraft. The additional recommendations with reference to CRAF are contained in recommendation No. 5.

2. Tactical airlift requirements and capabilities

Having concluded that there are serious deficiencies both as to the availability and positioning of tactical aircraft, the subcommittee recommends the acquisition of additional assault-type modern aircraft to enhance the current tactical fleet of the Tactical Air Command, and as replacements for the aging C–123 aircraft currently in the active inventory. The subcommittee notes that the remaining C–119's in the active inventory are being phased out because of their ancient age. The subcommittee supports the Defense appropriation request of $70.4 million in the fiscal 1961 budget for the acquisition of additional new tactical aircraft.

3. Other airlift resources

The subcommittee calls attention to the various "private airlift" operations which exist within the Air Force, but outside of MATS, and in the other military services. In this category are the Strategic Support Squadrons of SAC, the Logistic Support Squadrons of AMC, and other similar type operations. The subcommittee is advised that these additional airlift resources are reviewed on an annual basis. It is recommended that in the next annual review full consideration be given to bringing these operations under centralized control.

4. Military Air Transport Service

(1) The subcommittee having determined that the strategic airlift capability of MATS cannot meet the wartime requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or limited war situations under present assumptions, recommends the modernization of MATS, as more specifically set forth in recommendation No. 7.

(2) While the subcommittee is unable to arrive at a precise hourly utilization rate for the aircraft within MATS, the subcommittee recommends that the utilization rate be established at not less than one-half of the surge rate required for extended operations in the event of general or limited war. It is obvious that further evaluation of this factor must be accomplished by appropriate military authorities and that the utilization rate to be established must be consistent with the military requirements placed upon MATS.

(3) The subcommittee recommends that MATS, in the performance of its peacetime utilization rate, continue to transport military traffic, first, in justification of meaningful training, and, secondly, as a matter of economy.

5. Civil reserve air fleet

The subcommittee concludes that, except for the modern jet passenger capacity available in CRAF, CRAF is as unable as MATS to meet its military requirements. In addition, the subcommittee concludes that the current CRAF program is not responsive to the military requirement in the following respects:

(1) CRAF responsibility to perform in times of emergency is predicated on a contractual relationship.

(2) Only one of the current CRAF participants has perfected an agreement with its employees, or their representatives, that they will forego work stoppages in the event their services are required to support a military requirement.

(3) There is no incentive to be a CRAF participant.

(4) There is no arrangement to provide for the contingency of partial activation of CRAF versus full activation.

On the basis of the foregoing:

(1) The subcommittee concludes that the current contractual relationship of CRAF participants does not produce a desirable degree of responsiveness to meet national emergencies. Existing law vests in the President the authority to take possession and assume control of transportation systems, or any portion thereof, in time of war. The subcommittee recommends that consideration be given to extending this authority to periods of national emergency short of general war.

(2) That, in addition to such other requirements as have been or may be established for participation in CRAF, CRAF participants shall be required to do the following:

(*a*) Execute agreements with their employees, or employee representatives, that will insure no work stoppages in the event their efforts are required, as determined by the President, to support a national military requirement;

(*b*) To have, or be firmly obligated to procure, modern, long-range, turbine-powered cargo aircraft.

(3) The subcommittee recommends that the Department of the Air Force promptly proceed with the development of a program which would insure both an adequate and an equitable participation of the participants in CRAF to meet the contingency of partial mobilization.

(4) The subcommittee recommends that the recommendations in this section be implemented by January 1, 1961.

6. Airlift procurement practices

The subcommittee recommends:

(1) That, to the extent of the congressional setaside in annual appropriation bills, the procurement of civil augmentation airlift be initially restricted to the participants of CRAF.

(2) That civil augmentation airlift be procured on an advertised competitive basis.

(3) That in the event advertised bidding does not result in a rate which is deemed by the procuring agency to be fair and reasonable, both to the Government and the bidder, that civil augmentation airlift be procured from CRAF participants on a negotiated basis under the terms of existing law.

(4) That competitive or negotiated contracts under (2) or (3) above, for such procurement shall be for periods not to exceed 3 years and include standard clauses for termination, etc., as provided in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations and other pertinent directives.

(5) That any contract negotiated under the foregoing provisions include an option on the part of the Government for annual reviews during the full term of the contract, with authority to extend the contract for increments of 1 year throughout the contract term, based on the Government's evaluation of the performance of the contractor.

(6) That the reasonableness of the negotiated rate of each negotiated contract shall be subject to annual review and, at the option of the Government, shall be subject to renegotiation.

(7) In the procurement of civil augmentation airlift from the participants of CRAF, the Commander of MATS, in order to insure maximum CRAF participation and an equitable consideration of all CRAF participants, shall exercise discretion in the award of contracts.

(8) That civil augmentation airlift requirements which cannot be met under any of the foregoing provisions, shall be procured on an advertised competitive basis from among any bidders who qualify with the bid specifications, without regard to participation in CRAF.

(9) That the recommendations in this section be implemented by January 1, 1961.

7. Modernization of MATS

(1) The subcommittee recommends the appropriation of $50 million to begin the development of a long-range, turbine-powered, uncompromised cargo aircraft.

(2) The subcommittee recommends, as interim modernization, the procurement of 100 off-the-shelf aircraft, of which 50 shall be turbine-powered, long-range aircraft with minimum modifications for cargo configuration, of KC–135 type, or equivalent. The subcommittee recommends that the remaining 50 be procured from available turboprop aircraft, with an extended range capability, of the C–130B type, or equivalent, and that there be no stretchout in the procurement of either type aircraft.

8. Role of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve in strategic airlift capability

The subcommittee recommends that, in addition to the six C–97 squadrons which have been established within the Air National Guard, that such additional C–97 units, as may be militarily justifiable, be established in either the Air National Guard or the Air Force Reserve; that additional KC–97's in their aerial-tanker configuration, in such number as may be justified by military considerations, be transferred to the Air National Guard or the Air Force Reserve, in order to establish a POL resupply capability in accordance with the lessons learned in the Big Slam Puerto Pines exercise; that as C–124's become excess to the active inventory they be transferred, in accordance with the requirements then existing, to the Air National Guard or the Air Force Reserve.

9. Military airlift exercises

The subcommittee concludes that an inadequate number of realistic military airlift training exercises have either been planned or executed and recommends increased emphasis upon the planning and execution of such exercises.

10. Allocation of strategic military aircraft

As has been previously pointed out in this report, the JCS approved "hard-core" requirements for general war are currently under review, with the strong likelihood that they will be increased to include additional TAC requirements and substantially increased Army requirements. This would necessitate a JCS reappraisal of the current requirements which govern the allocation or predesignation of MATS strategic airlift to specific "hard-core" missions. However, such

action would still not meet the current deficiency in the preplanning of the type and quantity of airlift required to implement plans for limited war situations. Therefore, the subcommittee recommends increased emphasis on the preparation of limited war plans, including the strategic military airlift requirements for the implementation of such plans.

11. Redesignation of MATS

The Military Air Transport System is a weapons system which is required in the performance of military missions involving strategic airlift. The subcommittee concludes that this system should have a designation which is more consistent with its mission. Accordingly, the subcommittee recommends that the Military Air Transport Service be redesignated the "Military Airlift Command."

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